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IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT CANADIAN COURTS recognize international

jurisdiction based on consent and that such consent can be expressly given
in advance by way of a contractual agreement, variously described as a forum
selection clause, jurisdiction clause, or choice of court agreement. This is the
case across the country, prescribed in Quebec by article 3148 of the Civil Code
and consistently admitted by courts in the common law provinces. A central
distinguishing factor between Quebec and the rest of the country is the absence
in the former of any discretion to disregard a forum selection clause that
designates a foreign court, whereas such a discretion, albeit very circumscribed,
remains available in the latter.1 A second significant difference is that Quebec law
specifically exempts consumers and employees from the general rule, declaring
that they are not bound by such clauses.2 Again, there is no equivalent express
exception in the rest of the country.3 Both of these distinctions are relevant to the
Hague Choice of Court Convention, as will be discussed further below.
The Hague Choice of Court Convention came into force on 1 October 2015,4
following its ratification by Mexico and the European Union.5 It has also been
signed by the United States, Ukraine, and Singapore, albeit only ratified by
Singapore. As a result of these ratifications, it will be applicable in jurisdictions
from both civil law and common law traditions. Its main objective is to establish
the validity of the jurisdiction of courts designated in forum selection clauses,
and to mandate the enforcement of these clauses, in addition to the subsequent
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by courts designated by these
clauses. Although Canada has yet to sign the Hague Convention, the Uniform

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

For a detailed consideration of this issue, see Geneviève Saumier & Jeffrey Bagg, “Forum
Selection Clauses before Canadian Courts: A Tale of Two (or Three?) Solitudes” (2013)
46:2 UBC L Rev 439.
Art 3149 CCQ.
Although consumers or employees may be able to avoid the clause by invoking contract
defences or public policy. In the employment context, see e.g. Stubbs v ATS International BV,
2010 ONCA 879 at para 58, 272 OAC 386; Douez v Facebook, 2017 SCC 33, 411 DLR
(4th) 434 [Facebook].
Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, Hague
Conference on Private International Law (entered into force 1 October 2015), online: <www.
hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98> [Hague Convention].
As between member states of the European Union, the Brussels regime pre-empts the Hague
Convention regime.
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Law Conference of Canada (“ULCC”) adopted a model implementation
statute in 2010.6
This article examines whether the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Act
(“CJPTA”)7 has readied Canada to adopt the Hague Convention. To answer this
question, I will consider how the CJPTA deals with forum selection clauses with
a view to identifying points of consensus or dissension between it and the Hague
Convention. My conclusion is that, while the law governing forum selection
clauses in CJPTA jurisdictions in Canada is largely compatible with the broad
policy objectives underlying the Hague Convention, the CJPTA itself hinders
rather than helps establish the conditions for adoption of the Hague Convention.
The adoption of the Hague Convention by Canada would, however, provide
an added incentive to make amendments to the CJPTA that are necessary to
provide clarity and predictability in the treatment of forum selection clauses in
CJPTA jurisdictions.
This article will take a chronological approach to the issue. The first part will
review the state of the law on forum selection clauses prior to the adoption of
the CJPTA by the ULCC in 1994 and examine how the CJPTA deals with these
clauses. The second part will consider how the law developed from 1994 onwards
and how this affected the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses under the CJPTA,
which first came into force in Saskatchewan only ten years later in 2004. It will
also consider the impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in
Douez v Facebook. The third part will then provide a brief overview of the Hague
6.

7.

See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements Act (2010), Uniform Law Conference of
Canada, online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/current-uniform-acts/645-hagueconvention-choice-of-court/1404-hague-convention-on-choice-of-court-agreements-act>.
See also Vaughan Black, “The Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Common Law”
(Paper delivered at the Annual Proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada,
Charlottetown, September 2007), online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2116549> [Black, “Hague and
Common Law”]; Frédérique Sabourin, “Quebec Law and the Hague Convention of Choice
of Court Agreements of 2005” (Paper delivered at the Annual Proceedings of the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada, Charlottetown, September 2007), online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/
uniform-acts-new-order/current-uniform-acts/645-hague-convention-choice-of-court/1509hague-convention-choice-of-court-agreement-quebec-law-2007>.
See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting,
1994, Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/
images/stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_Proceedings_Transfer_Act.
pdf> at 140 [CJPTA]. This is a model Act published by the Uniform Law Conference
of Canada (ULCC). Three jurisdictions in have brought the CJPTA into force—British
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan. See Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer
Act, SBC 2003, c 28; Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003 (2nd Sess),
c 2; The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1.
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Convention to squarely address the question of whether the CJPTA facilitates or
hinders the adoption of that Convention.

I. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN THE PRE-CJPTA
PERIOD AND IN THE CJPTA
Prior to the introduction of the CJPTA in 1994, courts in the common law
provinces largely approached the enforcement of forum selection clauses in a
similar manner. Thus, a plaintiff could institute proceedings in the court designated
by the clause and this alone was sufficient grounds for service ex juris.8 Where
the plaintiff sought to begin proceedings in a court other than the contractually
agreed-upon one, Canadian common law courts also followed a similar approach.
For example, in 1988, the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal reviewed
English and Canadian cases and concluded that a “properly framed contractual
choice of forum … should be upheld unless the [plaintiff] can establish that the
balance of convenience massively favours an opposite conclusion.”9 In so holding,
the court referred specifically to a similar conclusion by the Court of Appeal of
Alberta three years earlier.10 The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered
that “Canadian courts will respect contracting parties’ choice of forum to resolve
disputes arising from their contractual relationship unless there is strong cause to
override the agreement.”11 In other words, Canadian common law courts were
prepared to give effect to a forum selection clause, whether the clause conferred
jurisdiction on them or another court. This view was implicitly approved by
the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Morguard Investments Ltd

8.

For an overview of service rules see Black, “Hague and Common Law,” supra note 6 at
paras 39-62. Appropriate service was sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the court,
notwithstanding the absence of any other connection between the defendant or the claim
and the court. Of course, the conferral of jurisdiction by consent does not extend to
subject-matter jurisdiction. See e.g. Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas S Rafferty, Conflict of Laws,
2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at 70.
9. Oulton Agencies Inc v Knolloffice Inc, 69 Nfld & PEIR 65 at para 23, 48 DLR (4th) 545.
10. Ibid at paras 21-22, citing Volkswagen Canada Inc v Auto Haus Frohlich Ltd (1985),
65 AR 271, [1986] 1 WWR 380 (CA).
11. Sarabia v The Oceanic Mindoro (1996), 26 BCLR (3d) 143 at para 35, [1997] 2 WWR 116
(CA) [Sarabia]. This decision is subsequent to the adoption of the CJPTA by the ULCC but
prior to its adoption by the British Columbia legislature in 2003 and coming into force in
2006. It is worth noting that the court in Sarabia enforced a forum selection clause in an
employment contract.
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v De Savoye in 1990, where jurisdiction based on consent was declared to be
“appropriate,” even though that case did not refer to forum selection clauses.12
Typically, if a court has jurisdiction, a defendant can seek a stay on grounds
of forum non conveniens.13 Nothing in the forum non conveniens doctrine excludes
its application where a court derives its jurisdiction from a forum selection clause.
However, the language quoted previously from courts dealing with such clauses
designating a foreign court suggested a different test for the exercise of discretion
with regard to a forum selection clause. In such a case, the party seeking to avoid
the clause must show a “strong cause” why it should not be enforced, or show that
the “balance of convenience” massively favours that result. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal further stated that the “‘strong cause’ that the plaintiff must
show” must go “beyond mere balance of convenience.”14 As the main argument
supporting this position was that parties should be held to their bargain, there
was no reason in principle for the test to be different depending on whether the
court was the designated or the excluded court. Despite this possible ambiguity
on the role of forum non conveniens in cases involving jurisdiction clauses, at the
time the CJPTA was adopted the exact features of the discretion did not appear
to be a contentious issue.
When the ULCC put forward the CJPTA, it was intended to “bring
Canadian jurisdictional rules into line with the principles laid down by the SCC
in Morguard Investments and Amchem Products.”15 As noted previously, these two
cases were not concerned with, nor did they even mention, forum selection clauses.
Morguard Investments did, however, specifically state that consent had been, and
remained, a legitimate basis for international jurisdiction. The CJPTA expressly
states that it is the sole source for the determination of “territorial competence”
of courts in the enacting jurisdiction.16 The commentary explains that this is “to
make it clear that a court’s territorial competence is to be determined according
to the rules in the Act and not according to any ‘common law’ jurisdictional rules

12. Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1093, 76 DLR (4th) 256
[Morguard Investments].
13. The contours of that doctrine had been revised by the SCC in the 1993 decision Amchem
Products Incorporated v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), but it did not deal
at all with forum selection clauses. See Amchem Products Incorporated v British Columbia
(Workers’ Compensation Board), [1993] 1 SCR 897, 102 DLR (4th) 96 [Amchem Products].
14. Sarabia, supra note 11 at para 38 [emphasis added].
15. See introductory comments in CJPTA, supra note 7.
16. Ibid, s 2(2).
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that the Act replaces.”17 This invites an interpretation of the CJPTA that excludes
recourse to common law rules, past, present or future.18
The CJPTA also claimed to have “codified” the doctrine of forum non
conveniens as expressed by the SCC in Amchem Products. The commentary to
section 11 states that the “factors listed in section 11(2) … have been expressly
or implicitly considered by courts in the past.”19 One might quibble that forum
non conveniens does not “determine” a court’s territorial competence but rather
informs its decision to decline to exercise that competence.20 In that sense, the
admonition of the ULCC not to refer to common law in interpreting the CJPTA
might not apply to that section. On the other hand, the commentary does refer
to both Morguard Investments and Amchem Products as sources for the CJPTA’s
“jurisdictional rules,” suggesting that to the ULCC, both section 3 (on territorial
competence) and section 11 (on forum non conveniens) are such rules.21
The CJPTA mentions forum selection clauses only in section 3, establishing
that a court has jurisdiction if “there is an agreement between the plaintiff and
[the defendant] to the effect that the court has jurisdiction in the proceeding.”22
As seen above, this merely replicates the law existing at the time. The CJPTA does
not expressly address the situation where the court is seized despite an agreement
between the parties that any dispute will be brought before a foreign court. This
is surprising because the bulk of cases up to that time concerned this very issue
and not the situations involving prior agreement. There is no mention of this
even in the commentary.
One might have expected that this latter issue would have been dealt with
in section 11 on “discretion as to the exercise of territorial competence.” This
17. Ibid.
18. See Stephen Pitel’s paper for a discussion of the different answers to these questions in the
CJPTA provinces. Stephen GA Pitel, “Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other? Jurisdiction in
Common Law Canada” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 63.
19. I will refer to the section numbers from the ULCC model act, which are the same as those in
the British Columbia Act, but not in the Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan enactments, where
section 11 is numbered 12 and 10, respectively. See CJPTA, supra note 7.
20. The Supreme Court of Canada has reiterated that distinction more than once. See e.g. Club
Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [Van Breda]. See also Canada Post
Corp v Lépine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 SCR 549.
21. To a certain extent, the Supreme Court of Canada might be seen to have confirmed this
view when it held that section 11 of the CJPTA “constitutes a complete codification of
the common law test for forum non conveniens. It admits of no exceptions.” See Teck
Cominco Metals Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11 at para 22, [2009] 1 SCR 321
[Teck Cominco].
22. See CJPTA, supra note 7, s 3. This is section 4 in Nova Scotia, but section 3 in other
CJPTA jurisdictions.

SAUMIER, HAS THE CJPTA READIED CANADA 147

would have been consistent with the prevailing approach according to which
courts had a discretion not to enforce jurisdiction clauses. But section 11 does
not mention jurisdictional clauses. Instead, section 11 is of general application
and applies equally to any of the jurisdictional bases enumerated in section 3.
This means that a stay can be requested even where jurisdiction is established by
“an agreement between the parties” under section 3(c). And while section 11(2)
provides a list of factors to be considered in deciding whether “another court
is more appropriate,” the existence of a forum selection clause is not included.
Even though the list is not closed (meaning that the jurisdiction clause could be
considered), it would still only be one element among others, since the CJPTA
prescribes that the listed factors “must” be considered.23
On its face, therefore, the CJPTA does several things with respect to forum
selection clauses. First, it confirms that jurisdiction can be conferred by prior
consent of the parties.24 Second, it does not exclude the possibility that a stay of
this jurisdiction is available.25 Third, it posits a universal approach to the exercise
of that discretion to stay proceedings. In so doing, it does not codify the prevailing
view at the time which was that the applicable test for that discretion is stricter or
different than what might apply in the absence of a forum selection clause; nor
does it confirm or deny that this stricter test applies to any forum selection clause,
whether it confers or excludes the jurisdiction of the court deciding whether to
stay the action. This silence has been the source of confusion and debate, as will
be discussed in the next section.

II. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1994: AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE CJPTA
The 2003 Supreme Court of Canada decision in ZI Pompey Industrie v Ecu-Line
NV 26 is the most significant development occurring between the adoption of

23. For a detailed and critical consideration of this line of reasoning, see Vaughan Black, Stephen
GA Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and
Proceedings Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 207-211.
24. CJPTA, supra note 7, s 3(c).
25. CJPTA, supra note 7, s 11.
26. 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 SCR 450 [Pompey].
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the CJPTA by the ULCC and its coming into force in the enacting provinces.27
While endorsing the strong cause test, the Court stated the following:
There is a similarity between the factors which are to be taken into account when
considering an application for a stay based on a forum selection clause and those
factors which are weighed by a court considering whether to stay proceedings in
“ordinary” cases applying the forum non conveniens doctrine … but the presence of
a forum selection clause … is … sufficiently important to warrant a different test,
one where the starting point is that parties should be held to their bargain. … I am
not convinced that a unified approach to forum non conveniens, where a choice of
jurisdiction clause constitutes but one factor to be considered, is preferable.28

On its own, this statement might be difficult to reconcile with an approach
to forum selection clauses under the CJPTA that would treat these as one more
factor in the list of factors to be considered under section 11(2).29
On the other hand, the Court endorsed a list of seven factors for evaluating
strong cause from the prevailing English case, The Eleftheria, which include:
location of evidence, applicable law, connection of parties, enforceability of
ensuing judgment, limitation periods, availability of security for costs, and risk of
an unfair trial.30 As noted in the preceding quotation, the overlap between these
factors and those for “ordinary” forum non conveniens at common law and under
the CJPTA is evident. The effect of Pompey can thus better be understood as
involving two elements: establishing a presumption that a (valid) forum selection
clause is to be enforced, and placing a heavy burden to rebut this presumption
on the party seeking a stay to avoid the enforcement of that clause.31 Admittedly,
this might not be so different from the “ordinary” forum non conveniens analysis
which requires that the defendant seeking to displace the forum validly chosen

27. The judgment repeatedly specifies that it is dealing with forum selection clauses in bills of
lading (see ibid at paras 21-22, 24, 39), and might be interpreted to be limited to this matter.
However, it has been widely cited since as generally applicable to forum selection clauses
regardless of the nature of the contract involved.
28. Ibid at para 21.
29. See Facebook, supra note 3.
30. Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board Ship or Vessel Eleftheria v The Eleftheria (Owners)
(1969), [1969] 2 All ER 641 at 645, [1970] P 94.
31. This formulation is neutral in that it allows Pompey to be relevant to both situations
involving forum selection clauses: where the court seized is designated and where a foreign
court is designated.
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by the plaintiff 32 show that another forum is clearly more appropriate.33 It might
be worth noting that in Amchem Products, the SCC held that the burden of proof
was unlikely to be decisive in forum non conveniens cases.34 Whether that holds
also in the face of a forum selection clause was not discussed in that case.
This incongruity in the Pompey reasoning was picked up in 2010 by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Expedition Helicopters Inc v Hollywell Inc.35 In its
judgment, the court put forward a much narrower set of factors for assessing
“strong cause” that excluded those going to the balance of convenience and others
typical of a forum non conveniens analysis.36 Because Ontario has not adopted the
CJPTA, the Court of Appeal was obviously not concerned with trying to fit such
a proposal within the CJPTA. This revised version of the “strong cause” test has
been noted in CJPTA jurisdictions, although without any apparent consideration
of its implications on the way in which forum selection clauses are to be analyzed
under that statute.37
The first, and most significant, decision for CJPTA jurisdictions came from
the SCC in a 2009 case coming from British Columbia. In Teck Cominco Metals
Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters, the defendant sought a stay of BC proceedings on
the basis that parallel proceedings were already pending in Washington State.
In so doing, the defendant argued that the decision to stay should not depend
on section 11, but rather should be granted on the basis of comity, respecting the

32. This follows from the fact that jurisdiction must be established or admitted prior to
considering forum non conveniens.
33. See Van Breda, supra note 20 at paras 101-112. The Supreme Court of Canada reiterates this
and glosses over the fact that the CJPTA does not use the word “clearly.” Courts in CJPTA
jurisdictions have since interpreted section 11 with reference to Van Breda and the “clearly
more appropriate” standard. See e.g. JTG Management Services Ltd v Bank of Nanjing Co
Ltd, 2015 BCCA 200 at paras 42-47, 372 BCAC 94; Frank and Ellen Remai Foundation
Inc v Bennett Jones LLP, 2016 SKQB 213 at paras 40-42, 269 ACWS (3d) 669; Armoyan v
Armoyan, 2013 NSCA 99 at para 219, 334 NSR (2d) 204 [Armoyan].
34. See Geneviève Saumier, “Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases: The Supreme Court’s
Unfinished Business” (1995) 18:2 Dal LJ 447 for a discussion of that aspect of Amchem
Products and the challenge it posed in later cases, notably Frymer v Brettschneider (1994),
19 OR (3d) 60, 115 DLR (4th) 744 (CA).
35. 2010 ONCA 351 at para 11, 100 OR (3d) 241 [Expedition Helicopters], leave to appeal to
SCC refused, 33790 (25 November 2010). For a detailed discussion see Saumier & Bagg,
supra note 1 at 458-462.
36. Expedition Helicopters, supra note 35 at para 24.
37. See e.g. Viroforce Systems Inc v R&D Capital Inc, 2011 BCCA 260 at para 16, 336 DLR (4th)
570 [Viroforce]; Microcell Communications Inc v Frey, 2011 SKCA 136 at para 115, 342 DLR
(4th) 513 [Microcell]; Armoyan, supra note 33 at para 329.
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foreign court’s concrete assertion of jurisdiction.38 In the alternative, the defendant
asked that the assertion of jurisdiction by the foreign court be considered to have
greater weight than other factors in a section 11 analysis. The SCC rejected both
arguments. In response to the second argument, the Court said the following:
[H]ad actual assertion of jurisdiction by a foreign court been seen as a factor that
should override all others, one would have expected the legislature to have stated
this expressly. Rather, avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is simply listed along
with other factors. This suggests that the existence of foreign proceedings is only one
factor, among many, to be considered in a forum non conveniens analysis.39

One might make the same argument about forum selection clauses. If the
CJPTA legislators had seen these as factors to be weighted differently, they would
have stated this expressly. Unlike in Teck Cominco, where the factor of “multiple
proceedings” was at least included in the list of factors (and was therefore
admitted to be relevant), jurisdictional clauses are not even mentioned in section
11. Regarding the more dramatic claim that the CJPTA did not address how to
deal with parallel proceedings at all, the SCC responded in this manner:
The CJPTA creates a comprehensive regime that applies to all cases where a stay of
proceedings is sought on the ground that the action should be pursued in a different
jurisdiction (forum non conveniens). It requires that in every case … all the relevant
factors listed in s. 11 be considered in order to determine if a stay of proceedings is
warranted.40

The Court added that “section 11 of the CJPTA thus constitutes a complete
codification of the common law test for forum non conveniens. It admits of no
exceptions.”41 Combined with the previous statement from Pompey, these two
statements from Teck Cominco might be understood to confirm that forum
selection clauses are not included in section 11 of the CJPTA. In other words,
if the test relevant to forum selection clauses is not the same as the test for forum
non conveniens, then the fact that section 11 is only a codification of forum non
conveniens means that it is not applicable to forum selection clauses. While this
allows for some reconciliation of the two Supreme Court of Canada cases, it does
not necessarily assist courts in CJPTA jurisdictions dealing with forum selection
clauses. Moreover, because the factors for “strong cause” from Pompey are
largely equivalent to those found in section 11 CJPTA for forum non conveniens,
38. Teck Cominco, supra note 21 at para 17. The decision reports that a stay of proceedings had
been sought in Washington, but was refused.
39. Ibid at para 25.
40. Ibid at para 21.
41. Ibid at para 22.
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it is challenging to maintain in practice the theoretical distinction between the
two suggested by Pompey. The different approaches taken in the early CJPTA
jurisprudence in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, to which I now turn,
confirm these interpretive challenges.42
The British Columbia Court of Appeal was called upon in 2011 and 2012
to consider forum selection clauses (both designating foreign courts). In the
first case, Viroforce Systems v R&D Capital,43 the court held that the test was
prescribed by Pompey and was a separate inquiry that should be conducted prior
to an inquiry under section 11 of the CJPTA. In the second case, Preymann v
Ayus Technology Corp,44 the court confirmed this approach, holding in addition
that it was consistent with Pompey and did not conflict with the Supreme Court
of Canada’s statements in Teck Cominco regarding the nature and scope of section
11 of the CJPTA.
Two decisions from the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan purported to
agree with Viroforce that Pompey continues to be relevant to the assessment of
forum selection clauses. But in Microcell Communications v Frey, the court added
that because these clauses are to be considered in response to requests for stays
of proceedings, it is section 11 of the CJPTA that provides the framework.45 This
was reiterated in Hudye Farms v Canadian Wheat Board—handed down the same
day—but with the added caveat that “the presence of a forum selection clause is
not just one factor among many contained in s[ection] 11.”46
One might ask whether there is really any difference between the two
approaches in practice. The answer is not obvious upon a reading of the cases from
42. The courts in Nova Scotia have not squarely faced this issue. Decisions concerning forum
selection clauses appear to proceed on the understanding that the strong cause test from
Pompey applies with no real consideration of how this fits within the CJPTA analysis.
See e.g. 2288450 Ontario Ltd v Novajet, 2016 NSSC 77, 373 NSR (2d) 79 [Novajet];
Instrument Concepts-Sensor Software Inc v Geokinetics Acquisition Company, 2012 NSSC
62, 313 NSR (2d) 200; Curves International, Inc v Archibald, 2011 NSSC 217, 303 NSR
(2d) 288 [Curves].
43. Viroforce, supra note 37.
44. 2012 BCCA 30, 346 DLR (4th) 541.
45. Microcell, supra note 37 at para 112. The court here refers specifically to “the fair and efficient
working of the Canadian legal system as a whole” as outlined in section 11(2)(f ) of the
CJPTA. See CJPTA, supra note 7. For a criticism of this, and for other cases relying on the
listed factors in section 11 of the CJPTA, see Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 23 at 207-08.
46. Hudye Farms v Canadian Wheat Board, 2011 SKCA 137 at para 11, 342 DLR (4th) 659.
Vaughan Black provides a detailed analysis of this case, particularly regarding the often
forgotten transfer aspect of the CJPTA. See Vaughan Black, “Cross-Border Transfers of Court
Proceedings” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 239. See also Black, “Hague and Common
Law,” supra note 6.
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the CJPTA jurisdictions. Indeed, if the factors from Pompey are largely equivalent
to those in section 11, and if all courts agree that the onus is on the party seeking
to avoid the clause to show the “strong cause,” then whether one works within
section 11 or outside of it, there is not much to distinguish the approaches. The
difference would only arise if the reference to the section 11 analysis weakens
the impact of the forum selection clause by putting it on par or only slightly
ahead of the other factors.47 But the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan rejected
this explicitly in Hudye Farms, as noted above. What would make a difference,
however, would be the substitution of the factors outlined in Expedition Helicopters
for those previously endorsed in Pompey. Such an approach would eliminate the
option of inserting the forum selection clause analysis within section 11, since
the criteria would be distinct. But Expedition Helicopters has not made any real
inroads in the CJPTA provinces, and the SCC may have implicitly rejected that
approach by referring only to Pompey and the factors used in its strong cause test
in a 2012 judgment involving a forum selection clause from Ontario.48
The SCC finally had an opportunity to address forum selection clauses in the
CJPTA in its 2017 Facebook decision.49 Indeed, at the British Columbia Court of
Appeal level, the interpretive challenge was stated expressly:

47. Whatever the approach, there does seem to be more cases than anticipated where a “strong
cause” is found to exist under the Pompey factors. See e.g. Ping Leung v APK Holdings, 2013
SKQB 382, 431 Sask R 291; Yara Belle Plaine Inc v Ingersoll Rand Co, 2014 SKQB 254,
[2014] 11 WWR 140; Naturex v United Naturals, 2016 BCSC 1500, 270 ACWS (3d) 73;
Curves, supra note 42; Novajet, supra note 42; Armoyan, supra note 33.
48. Momentous.ca Corp v Canadian American Association of Professional Baseball Ltd, 2012 SCC 9
at para 9, [2012] 1 SCR 359 [Momentous].
49. Facebook, supra note 3. Facebook involved a request for certification of a class action for
breach of privacy rights under section 4 of the BC Privacy Act (see Privacy Act, RSBC 1996,
c 373) brought against Facebook on behalf of members resident in British Columbia.
Facebook sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of a forum selection clause designating
California courts in its terms of use. In a 3-1-3 split decision, the action was not stayed.
Three judges (Justices Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon) held that the Pompey “strong
cause” test applied but in a modified manner to account for the consumer context, leading
them to conclude that public policy reasons (grossly uneven bargaining power in the
consumer context and the enforcement of quasi-constitutional privacy rights), the interests of
justice, and the balance of convenience provided the requisite “strong cause” not to enforce
the otherwise valid forum selection clause. One judge (Justice Abella) held that the clause
was invalid on contractual grounds. Three judges (Chief Justice McLachlin, Justice Côté
and Justice Moldaver) dissented, finding that the clause was valid and enforceable as the
plaintiff had not met the burden of proving a “strong cause” to avoid its application. While
these issues are significant, they are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed
further unless necessary.
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The first issue to be considered is how the Pompey test for forum selection clauses
relates to the analytical framework for forum non conveniens in the CJPTA. When
the defendant relies upon a forum selection clause, should the court consider the
Pompey test and then, if necessary, carry out the CJPTA analysis, or should the
court consider the Pompey test as part of the CJPTA analysis?50

The British Columbia Court of Appeal had considered itself bound by
its previous decisions in Viroforce and Preymann, concluding that “when the
defendant relies upon a forum selection clause, the Pompey test is a separate,
standalone inquiry that is conducted first. The CJPTA analysis may be conducted
second, if necessary.”51 The Supreme Court of Canada essentially endorsed this
view, although it was sharply divided on many points, including the outcome
of the case.52 The Court was, however, unanimous in holding that the CJPTA
does not deal with forum selection clauses, whose enforcement remain to be
considered under the common law.53
The Court’s analysis is framed by the plaintiff’s assertion that forum selection
clauses should be examined within the framework for forum non conveniens as
provided in section 11 of the CJPTA.54 In flatly rejecting this, the Court relies
directly on Pompey and Teck Cominco: On the first to state that forum non
conveniens is not the test for forum selection clauses, and on the second to state
that section 11 of the CJPTA is a codification of forum non conveniens.55 For
the Court, the upshot is that the CJPTA “does not supplant the common law
principles underlying the enforcement of forum selection clauses,”56 given that it
“was never intended to replace the common law test for forum selection clauses.”57

50. Douez v Facebook Inc, 2015 BCCA 279 at para 21, 387 DLR (4th) 360 [Facebook CA]
[emphasis in original].
51. Ibid at para 31. The idea that a British Columbia court would conclude that there is a
“strong cause” to refuse enforcement of a forum selection clause and then proceed to decline
jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds is rather farfetched.
52. Facebook, supra note 3 at paras 81-85.
53. Ibid at paras 19-21, 127-131. Admittedly, in her separate reasons, Justice Abella only refers to
Pompey. See ibid at para 79.
54. Ibid at paras 19, 127.
55. Ibid at paras 19-21, 79, 127-133.
56. Ibid at para 131.
57. Ibid at para 22.
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Three difficulties with this reasoning can be noted. First, it overlooks the
fact that the CJPTA does deal with forum selection clauses in section 3(c).58 This
makes it impossible to claim that the CJPTA does not address forum selection
clauses. Take, for example, a jurisdictional clause designating British Columbia
courts. If litigation is initiated in British Columbia, this clause is covered by
section 3(c) of the CJPTA; if litigation is initiated in Saskatchewan, Facebook
states that this clause is not covered by the CJPTA. A straightforward application
of the CJPTA provides that a party trying to avoid the British Columbia court
in the first scenario need only invoke section 11 and argue forum non conveniens
to obtain a stay. Indeed, as noted above, section 3(c) is not exempted from the
scope of application of section 11. But following Facebook, a party should be
bound to a forum selection clause unless it can show a “strong cause” to avoid
the contractually agreed-upon forum. One would expect that, regardless of where
litigation is initiated, the test applicable to avoid a forum selection clause would be
the same—assuming that the arguments of certainty and predictability justifying
the enforcement of forum selection clauses apply.59 While this equivalent
treatment of forum selection clauses wherever invoked is not inconsistent with
the Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion in Facebook, it is difficult to reconcile
with the text of the CJPTA. The Court’s failure to account for section 3(c) in its
reasons is unfortunate and weakens its claim that the CJPTA was never intended
to deal with forum selection clauses.
The second difficulty with the decision in Facebook—which is connected to
the first—is that it seems to run counter to the purpose of the CJPTA, which is to
provide a statutory basis for questions of international jurisdiction that replaces,

58. Section 11 does not exclude its application to jurisdiction founded on s 3(c). See CJPTA,
supra note 7, ss 3(c), 11. This weakens the argument that forum non conveniens is not relevant
to jurisdiction based on agreement. See Facebook, supra note 3. In Facebook, the finding of
strong cause not to enforce the clause spared Justices Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon
from having to consider whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be invoked
once strong cause had been successfully pleaded to avoid enforcement of the clause. As these
judges note, Facebook abandoned its alternative forum non conveniens request before the
Supreme Court of Canada (see ibid at para 9). The three dissenting judges affirm explicitly
that forum non conveniens under the CJPTA remains available if a forum selection clause
fails under the strong cause test (see ibid at para 131). Despite this assertion by the minority,
it is difficult to imagine a situation where forum non conveniens would succeed once “strong
cause” not to enforce a forum selection clause has been found.
59. Case law does not support such a distinction. For a claim to the contrary, see Novajet, supra
note 42 at para 48.
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with minimal variations, the previously existing common law sources.60 This
should caution against any interpretation of the CJPTA that excludes from its
scope issues that evidently go to international jurisdiction. As noted above, the
aim of the CJPTA is “to make it clear that a court’s territorial competence is to be
determined according to the rules in the Act and not according to any ‘common
law’ jurisdictional rules that the Act replaces.”61 Yet the Court in Facebook holds
specifically that the CJPTA does not exclude recourse to the common law to deal
with forum selection clauses. One way around this incongruity is to contend that
a forum selection clause that refers to a foreign court has the effect of excluding
(or “ousting,” as is commonly said) the jurisdiction of the court not chosen.
Since the CJPTA’s section on territorial jurisdiction is only meant to determine
when courts have jurisdiction, it might be said that recourse to the common law
is still relevant to define when a party might properly exclude that jurisdiction,
which is essentially what the Supreme Court has said. Such a narrow reading of
the CJPTA fails to account for section 11, however, since forum non conveniens is
not a way of establishing jurisdiction either. Finally, the premise of this argument
is also contrary to the prevailing common law view that a forum selection clause
does not, in fact, oust the jurisdiction of the court; rather, it merely enforces the
private bargain between the parties.62
A final difficulty with the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in Facebook
is that it continues to assert that the test for “strong cause” is not equivalent to the
test for forum non conveniens, despite the obvious similarity between the factors
for both tests. It is unfortunate that the Court did not take this opportunity to
consider fully the argument for a true differentiation put forward by the Court of
Appeal for Ontario in Expedition Helicopters.63
As regards the central question in this article, the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Facebook has clarified rather than changed the law relating to the
interaction between forum selection clauses and the CJPTA, albeit in a rather
perfunctory manner. On the other hand, it has opened the door to differential
treatment of forum selection clauses in commercial and consumer contracts.
60. For discussion of the adoption of the CJPTA by the ULCC, see the text accompanying
note 7.
61. CJPTA, supra note 7, s 2(2).
62. But see Pitel & Rafferty, supra note 8 at 130-31 for a critical discussion concerning a possible
opening to that effect in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Momentous, supra note
48. See also Saumier & Bagg, supra note 1 at 472.
63. Expedition Helicopters, supra note 35. Indeed it is arguable that it had already done so
implicitly in Momentous in 2012. See Momentous, supra note 48. For a detailed discussion of
this point see Saumier & Bagg, supra note 1 at 458-462.
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This might offer additional potential for compatibility of Canadian law with the
Hague Convention, which is the subject of the final part of this article.

III. THE HAGUE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION AND THE
CJPTA
The Hague Choice of Court Convention states in its preamble that certainty and
effectiveness in the treatment of forum selection agreements enhances judicial
co-operation which itself promotes the desired goals of international trade
and investment. The rules of the Hague Convention are constructed to achieve
maximum certainty and effectiveness by limiting the opportunities available to
parties (and courts), to avoid the enforcement of forum selection clauses and
the judgments rendered by courts designated by these clauses. It is thus a dual
purpose convention establishing the validity of jurisdiction based on choice of
court agreements and mandating the enforcement of judgments rendered by
courts acting under such jurisdiction. In so doing, it also recognizes limitations
to both of those aspects but seeks to circumscribe them to minimize their effect.
Regarding the jurisdictional element, the Hague Convention imposes a
general rule according to which courts must enforce a valid forum selection
clause.64 This translates into two variants, depending on the circumstances. First,
where the court is the one designated by the clause, that court must recognize the
jurisdiction conferred upon it; it can only refuse to do so if the agreement is “null
and void” according to its own law.65 Moreover, the Hague Convention specifies
that the court cannot decline to exercise the jurisdiction established pursuant to
the parties’ agreement.66 Second, where the court is not the designated court,
it must “suspend or dismiss” the proceedings save in five defined situations.67

64. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art 5.
65. Ibid, arts 5(1), 5(3). Subject-matter jurisdiction and internal rules regarding venue
are not affected.
66. Ibid, art 5(2). The court cannot decline jurisdiction “on the ground that the dispute should
be decided in a court of another State.” See also Trevor Harley & Masato Dogauchi,
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements Explanatory Report, Hague
Conference on Private International Law (2013), online: <assets.hcch.net/upload/expl37final.
pdf> at paras 132-33 [Explanatory Report]. According to the Explanatory Report, this is
intended to exclude recourse to either forum non conveniens or lis pendens as justifications for
staying or dismissing proceedings brought before the chosen court.
67. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art 6.
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Two of these relate to the validity of the agreement.68 Two others refer to practical
impediments to enforcement.69 The last, and most open-ended exception, allows a
court to refuse enforcement to avoid a “manifest injustice” or where enforcement
would be “manifestly contrary to … public policy.”70 The Explanatory Report
gives little indication regarding what might qualify under this exception beyond
excluding references to the fact that the clause would not be binding under
domestic law.71 The Explanatory Report does, however, mention two instances of
relevance here: where trial in the chosen court might not be “fair,” or where the
agreement was the result of fraud.72
It is worth noting at this point that the “nullity” exception in articles 5 and
6 and the “public policy” exception in article 6 are further circumscribed by
the fact that the Hague Convention applies only in international commercial
cases.73 Indeed, the scope of the instrument specifically excludes purely domestic
cases as well as disputes involving consumers or employees, family matters,
personal injury, and real rights, among others.74 Since these are often areas where
jurisdiction agreements are either prohibited or otherwise subject to restrictions
under domestic law, their complete exclusion from the Hague Convention
necessarily reduces the scope of the exceptions to enforcement. The Hague
Convention also allows an individual state to formally declare that it will not
apply to a specific matter,75 thereby further narrowing the scope of application of
the “public policy” exception.
Turning to the recognition and enforcement element of the Hague
Convention, it guarantees that judgments rendered by designated courts will
68. Ibid, arts 6(a), 6(b). Invalidity according to the law of the state of the chosen court (but not
the lex fori) or lack of capacity according to the lex fori justify a refusal to enforce the clause.
See Explanatory Report, supra note 66 at paras 149-150. Unusually, the reference to the
applicable law is said to include choice-of-law rules, which jeopardizes the uniformity of
solutions otherwise sought—particularly with reference to the nullity of the clause.
69. Hague Convention, supra note 4, arts 6(d), 6(e). Where the chosen court has “decided not to
hear the case” (ibid, art 6(e)) or where the agreement cannot “for exceptional reasons beyond
the control of the parties, … reasonably be performed” (ibid, art 6(d)).
70. Ibid, art 6(c).
71. Explanatory Report, supra note 66 at paras 152-53.
72. Ibid at paras 188-190. The fairness of the foreign trial is one of the factors admitted under
Pompey. Fraud is arguably already covered by questions of validity of the clause.
73. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art 1.
74. Ibid, art 2.
75. Ibid, art 21. Some provincial legislatures may thus wish to exclude the application of
the Hague Convention in some particular field where provincial legislation prohibits
or circumscribes the operation of forum selection clauses, in franchise or privacy
legislation, for example.
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circulate amongst contracting states.76 This may be the signal achievement
of the Hague Convention:77 Putting court litigation on a par with arbitration,
which benefits from a generous enforcement regime under the 1958 New York
Convention,78 in force across Canada and in 156 other states internationally.
As with jurisdiction, the Hague Convention mandates recognition or enforcement
and refusal to do so can only follow on grounds specifically provided for in the
Hague Convention itself (particularly article 9). These mirror the reasons for
refusal to enforce a jurisdictional clause, including validity issues, procedural
justice,79 and public policy defences.80
This brief overview of the Hague Convention highlights the main differences
with the treatment of forum selection clauses in Canadian common law provinces,
including those that have adopted the CJPTA. While the Hague Convention
replicates the principle of enforcement of jurisdiction clauses, it largely eliminates
the discretion granted to Canadian common law courts, now confirmed by
Facebook to be defined by the “strong cause” doctrine under Pompey and not
included within the operation of section 11 of the CJPTA. Of course, that
discretion can continue to operate outside the commercial field since the Hague
Convention is limited to that sphere. Indeed, while the Hague Convention might
be understood to imply that forum selection clauses in consumer or employment

76. Ibid, art 8.
77. For a history of the project from a Canadian/Quebec perspective, see Jeffrey Talpis & Nick
Krnjevic, “The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of June 30, 2005:
The Elephant that Gave Birth to a Mouse” (2006) 13:1 Sw J Trade Am 1. But a renewed
attempt to develop an enforcement-only instrument has been afoot since 2012. See Hague
Conference on Private International Law, “The Judgments Project: Special Commission on
the Judgments Project,” online: <www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments>.
78. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330
UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [New York Convention]. The New York Convention
was ratified by Canada in 1986.
79. Hague Convention, supra note 4, arts 8(2), 9(c). The Hague Convention outlines two
rules dealing with default judgments that seek to protect the procedural rights of the
absent defendant.
80. Ibid, art 9(e). There are special rules in the Hague Convention regarding damages and
settlements. See ibid, arts 11, 12.

SAUMIER, HAS THE CJPTA READIED CANADA 159

contracts should be subject to a different regime, it does not impose one.81
Finally, the Hague Convention’s principle of enforcement of judgments rendered
by designated courts is also consistent with the Canadian approach according
to which jurisdiction based on consent is recognized as “appropriate,” and
therefore sufficient to meet the jurisdictional hurdle for recognition developed
for interprovincial and international judgments under Morguard Investments and
Beals v Saldanha.82 As for other defences at the judgment stage, again, there is
significant convergence in admitting procedural and public policy objections.83
Vaughan Black’s article to the ULCC on forum selection clauses in Canadian
common law and the Hague Convention presented a detailed and comprehensive
review of the issue in 2007. At that point, he concluded that “the differences
between the Convention and existing Canadian law [are] slim, [and] arguably they
are getting slimmer.”84 The main difference was not of principle but of method:
The main dissimilarities between the Convention and the common law relate not to
deep discrepancies about the general shape of the law or the goals to be pursued, but
rather to legal method – that is, to how those goals should be pursued. To be more
specific, the Convention seeks to define any exceptions to its general goals in narrow
and exhaustive language – language that adopts bright-line rules that could easily be
incorporated in a statute without significant change, or indeed without any change.
In contrast, the common law, as it frequently does, seeks to preserve a measure of
81. As indicated in the introduction, Quebec law declares that forum selection clauses are
not binding in these types of contracts (see art 3149 CCQ). Ontario does not have any
special legislation for employment contracts and I am not convinced that a combination
of sections 7 and 100 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Schedule A
has the same effect as Quebec law for consumer contracts. The Uniform Law Conference
of Canada has adopted a uniform jurisdiction and choice of law regime for consumer
contracts in common law Canada but it has not yet been adopted by any jurisdiction. See
Uniform Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Act (2004), Uniform Law Conference of Canada,
online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/current-uniform-acts/739-jurisdiction/
civil-jurisdiction/2063-jurisdiction-and-consumer-protection>.
82. Morguard Investments, supra note 12; Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 SCR 416 [Beals].
83. The Hague Convention rule regarding potential non-enforcement of punitive damages awards
is permissive only and therefore does not conflict with Canadian precedents that have
refused to see these as necessarily against public policy. See Beals, supra note 82 at para 76;
Old North State Brewing Co v Newlands Services Inc (1998), 47 BCLR (3d) 258, 155 DLR
(4th) 250 (CA); and most recently, Tracy (Litigation Guardian of ) v The Iranian Ministry of
Information and Security, 2016 ONSC 3759 at para 108, 400 DLR (4th) 670. For a review
under Saskatchewan’s statutory scheme (The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, SS 2005,
c E-9.121), see Britton v Simon Estate, 2016 SKQB 30, 395 DLR (4th) 139.
84. Black, “Hague and Common Law,” supra note 6 at para 2. See also H Scott Fairley &
John Archibald, “After the Hague: Some Thoughts on the Impact on Canadian Law of the
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements” (2006) 12:2 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 417.
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flexibility, open-endedness and judicial discretion, and to eschew a definitive a priori
inventory of exceptions because such a closed list might render a court incapable of
reaching a fair result in all cases. To a considerable extent, therefore, a preference
for one or the other of these approaches – the Convention or the common law –
will be conditioned by one’s general preference for either (1) certainly and ex ante
knowability, perhaps at the risk of rigidity and the cost of occasionally failing to do
justice in every case, or (2) an adaptable and open-textured regime that prizes justice
in the individual case but achieves that (if at all) only at the cost of vagueness of
language and consequently less certainty of outcome.85

In other words, should the Hague Convention be implemented in Canada,
that would mean replacing the ad hoc judicial discretion based on “strong
cause” with a specific obligation to enforce forum selection clauses with limited
exclusions that do not include most of the factors from Pompey. The acceptability
of that trade-off would obviously depend on the gains accruing as a result of
ratification of the Hague Convention that would justify giving up some aspects of
the “strong cause” test not replicated in the Hague Convention.
Written in 2007, Black’s report could not fully consider the impact of CJPTA
jurisprudence on that question. Still, he suggested that for CJPTA jurisdictions,
implementation of the Hague Convention would require stating that the latter
“prevailed over that province’s CJPTA, or at least over s. 11 of that statute.”86
This statement presaged the uncertainty relating to the manner in which the
CJPTA could be used to deal with forum selection clauses, as exemplified in
the case law from British Columbia and Saskatchewan. As discussed above,
this uncertainty has been largely eliminated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Facebook.
It remains accurate to state that the CJPTA, as currently drafted, cannot
accommodate the jurisdictional obligations that would flow from implementation
of the Hague Convention. Of course, implementation legislation could expressly
state that it supersedes the CJPTA. In addition, given that the Hague Convention
is directed only at international situations, provincial legislatures would not be
bound to endorse it in cases where both the forum seized and the forum selected
are in Canadian provinces.87 As such, the CJPTA would have a continuing role
to play in interprovincial cases. But even for those cases, the current situation is
85. Black, “Hague and Common Law,” supra note 6 at para 22 [emphasis in original].
86. Ibid at para 43.
87. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art 1(2). Article 1(2) of the Hague Convention specifies that
it applies “unless the parties are resident in the same Contracting State … and [the dispute
is] connected only with that State.” In other words, an interprovincial dispute involving
Canadian-resident parties is not within the scope of the Hague Convention.
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not without ambiguity given that there remain gaps even after Facebook, such as
the treatment of section 3(c) of the CJPTA and the ad hoc evaluation of forum
selection clauses in consumer cases.
There may thus be more work to be done following Facebook in terms of
dealing with forum selection clauses in CJPTA jurisdictions. Legislatures in
those jurisdictions might choose not to wait for a future decision and consider
amending their statutes in order to clarify how forum selection clauses are to be
treated in a comprehensive matter, whether these designate or exclude the forum
seized by the plaintiff. Indeed, the legislatures are not bound by the Supreme
Court of Canada’s interpretation in Facebook of its own case law in Pompey and
Teck Cominco or its views on general principles governing forum selection clauses.
There is nothing preventing legislatures from choosing to follow a different path,
and removing discretion (as Quebec has done), as there is no indication of any
constitutional impediments in this area. Another option would be for the ULCC
to propose a revision to the CJPTA to include all aspects of forum selection
clauses, thereby providing a uniform model both for provinces who have already
adopted the CJPTA and those considering it later. If proposals for modification of
the CJPTA follow the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Facebook and
subject forum selection clauses in consumer contracts to a distinct enforcement
regime, this might better ready CJPTA jurisdictions for acceptance of the
Hague Convention.88
Since the advent of the CJPTA, international jurisdiction in Canadian
common law provinces has followed a bifurcated path: those provinces that have
adopted the statutory regime and those that continue to rely on the common law.
Yet, the CJPTA’s failure to deal comprehensively with forum selection clauses has
allowed for the continued relevance of the common law to deal with enforcement
of those clauses even in CJPTA provinces, as recently confirmed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Facebook. This is not an obstacle to the adoption of the Hague
Convention in CJPTA provinces (or in non-CJPTA provinces for that matter)
given the Canadian common law’s largely pro-enforcement approach to forum
selection clauses, at least in commercial cases. But insofar as the CJPTA continues
to present a gap in international jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of
forum selection clauses, it would benefit from revisions for internal purposes
which should be undertaken with a view to facilitating, or at least not impeding,
the eventual adoption of the Hague Convention by Canada.

88. Arguably, even non-CJPTA provinces might more readily accept the Hague Convention’s
exclusion of consumer contracts following Facebook.

